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Abstract
Background: A bill to legalize physician-assisted suicide in the UK recently made significant
progress in the British House of Lords and will be reintroduced in the future. Until now there has
been little discussion of the clinical implications of physician-assisted suicide for the UK. This paper
describes problematical issues that became apparent from a review of the medical and psychiatric
literature as to the potential effects of legalized physician-assisted suicide.
Discussion: Most deaths by physician-assisted suicide are likely to occur for the illness of cancer
and in the elderly. GPs will deal with most requests for assisted suicide. The UK is likely to have
proportionately more PAS deaths than Oregon due to the bill's wider application to individuals with
more severe physical disabilities. Evidence from other countries has shown that coercion and
unconscious motivations on the part of patients and doctors in the form of transference and
countertransference contribute to the misapplication of physician-assisted suicide. Depression
influences requests for hastened death in terminally ill patients, but is often under-recognized or
dismissed by doctors, some of whom proceed with assisted death anyway. Psychiatric evaluations,
though helpful, do not solve these problems. Safeguards that are incorporated into physician-
assisted suicide criteria probably decrease but do not prevent its misapplication.
Summary: The UK is likely to face significant clinical problems arising from physician-assisted
suicide if it is legalized. Terminally ill patients with mental illness, especially depression, are
particularly vulnerable to the misapplication of physician-assisted suicide despite guidelines and
safeguards.
Background
A bill to legalize physician-assisted suicide in the UK
recently progressed further than ever before in the British
House of Lords. In 2005 Lord Joffe revised his Assisted
Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill, originally written to
legalize euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide (EAS),
to narrow the focus to physician-assisted suicide (PAS) in
England and Wales. The bill subsequently progressed to
its second reading in the House of Lords in May 2006.
Though peers voted to block the bill, Lord Joffe has
declared his intention to continue reintroducing his bill to
legalize PAS until it has proceeded through all parliamen-
tary stages. Over the course of this legislative process,
there has been little discussion of the clinical implications
of physician-assisted suicide for the UK [1,2].
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This paper summarizes some of the problematical clinical
and practical issues that became apparent from a review I
undertook to clarify what evidence exists to make a case
for or against PAS. Searches were done on Medline and
Google using the terms 'assisted suicide' and 'euthanasia'.
Euthanasia was included because it overlaps with PAS in
many respects and because its legalization has accompa-
nied that of PAS in Belgium and in the Netherlands [3]. In
addition, Lord Joffe has described this bill as the first step
"forward in incremental stages" (pp 53) [4] and there is no
reason to think that the goal to legalize euthanasia in the
UK has been abandoned. Also reviewed were the House of
Lords Select Committee on the Assisted Dying for the Termi-
nally Ill Bill Report and Evidence [4], Lord Joffe's Assisted
Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill [5], and the Oregon
Department of Human Services report on PAS [6]. Web-
sites of UK health professional societies were viewed for
position statements.
In addition to drawing on the substantial medical and
research literature on PAS, this paper addresses psychiatric
issues that have been overlooked in the UK debate. The
paper is framed in terms of the anticipated effects of PAS
for UK doctors who would deal with these requests and
addresses the following questions: What do doctors actu-
ally do in PAS? How will PAS likely affect a doctor's prac-
tice? How well do safeguards work to protect vulnerable
patients and to prevent coercion, both overt and covert?
And what role can doctors validly take in the UK debate
on PAS?
Discussion
What does the doctor do in physician-assisted suicide?
Physician-assisted suicide is when a doctor provides a
patient a lethal overdose of medication for self-adminis-
tration with the explicit goal of enabling the patient to
commit suicide. It is ethically and legally distinct from
prescribing medication with the express goal of pain relief
while understanding that death could occur earlier as a
secondary effect (the double effect principle). GPs will
deal with most assisted suicide requests in the UK, as they
do in Oregon and the Netherlands.
In Oregon, doctors assist suicide by prescribing an over-
dose of barbiturates that the patient takes orally as several
ounces of liquid. In 2005, the prescribing doctor was
present at 23% of PAS deaths. The complication of vomit-
ing occurred in 5% of cases. After taking the overdose,
patients became unconscious in 2–15 minutes (median 5
minutes) and died within 5 minutes-9.5 hours (median
26 minutes). One patient took the overdose, lost con-
sciousness in 25 minutes, and then regained conscious-
ness 65 hours later. This individual did not obtain another
PAS prescription and died 14 days later of the underlying
illness [6].
In the Netherlands, doctors assisting suicide prescribe an
antiemetic and an overdose of barbiturates in liquid or
crushed tablet form. Euthanasia is by intravenous barbit-
urates followed by a muscle relaxant to paralyse breath-
ing. Dutch doctors also administer high-dose opioids
with the explicit intention of causing death. Despite
acknowledging this to be euthanasia, Dutch researchers
have not counted these cases in reported numbers of vol-
untary, involuntary, and unreported euthanasia [7] in
their publications [8,9] or in evidence to the House of
Lords [4]. Complications occur in 7% of assisted suicides.
Doctors proceed to carry out euthanasia in 18% of initial
PAS cases, usually because death took longer than
expected, coma did not occur or the patient awoke from
the coma [10].
Lord Joffe's bill would "enable an adult who has capacity and
who is suffering unbearably as a result of a terminal illness to
receive medical assistance to die at his own considered and per-
sistent request" [5]. Similar to Oregon, the doctor who
agrees to participate in the PAS process is responsible for
determining the following: the patient has a terminal ill-
ness that will cause death within six months, the request
is voluntary (uncoerced), he has mental capacity, and his
'unbearable suffering' (subjectively defined by the patient
and either mental or physical) arises from the terminal ill-
ness, irregardless of whether suffering can be relieved or
treated. The doctor ensures that a palliative care specialist
sees the patient to provide information on palliative care.
A referral to a second doctor is made to confirm these cri-
teria.
The likely scope of physician-assisted suicide in the UK
Most deaths by PAS are likely to occur for the illness of
cancer and in the elderly. In 2005, 84% of Oregon PAS
deaths were for cancer. Also in 2005, 68% of Oregon PAS
deaths were of individuals aged 65 and older, consistent
with previous years [6]. Oregon's PAS data have been cited
somewhat out of context by some authors [1,11] who say
that patients using PAS are 'younger', to imply that they
are not elderly and so vulnerability is not an issue. To be
more accurate, what the Oregon data show is that younger
patients are more likely to use PAS than older patients if
they receive a terminal diagnosis, but older patients con-
stitute most PAS deaths. Also, the report states that the
median age of patients dying by PAS is 70 as opposed to
the median age of 78 in non-PAS deaths [6].
Oregon legalized PAS in 1997. Since a peak in 2003 of
13.6 PAS deaths/10,000 total deaths, the rate of PAS has
stabilized with a 2005 rate of 12.0/10,000 deaths, which
is about 1 in 800 Oregon deaths [6]. A recent survey com-
paring the UK to other European and Commonwealth
nations shows that the illegal practice of euthanasia and
PAS rarely occurs, with a current rate of 0% of deaths byBMC Family Practice 2006, 7:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/7/39
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PAS in the UK [12]. Although it has been estimated based
on Oregon's experience that passage of Lord Joffe's bill
would result in approximately 650 UK deaths by PAS
annually [4], the UK is likely to have proportionately
more PAS deaths than Oregon due to the bill's wider
application to individuals with more severe physical disa-
bilities. Lord Joffe's bill allows looser criteria for patients'
signatures and a greater degree of physician assistance
(Table 1) specifically to include individuals with greater
physical disability in the PAS process.
In terms of how often individual doctors in the UK may
face a PAS request, this will likely be infrequent. In 2005,
39 Oregon doctors wrote a total of 64 prescriptions for
PAS overdoses, one writing eight [6]. Most Dutch GPs may
do euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide (EAS) a few
times in a lifetime, while a few EAS advocates may do up
to eight a year [7]. The infrequency with which individual
doctors are involved in PAS reflects two factors: First, most
patients do not have a terminal illness, and the vast major-
ity of those who do, do not request assisted suicide. Sec-
ond, patients and families who want PAS tend to seek out
doctors who will agree to their request, leading to some
concentration of PAS in doctors who are known support-
ers of the practice. Patients are not required to forgo PAS
if their long-term GP or other consulting doctors assess
that they do not meet criteria. And some GPs may refer
such patients due to concern over ethics, legal liability, or
technical and clinical aspects of PAS. Though UK doctors
may seldom be directly involved, all would need to be
educated on PAS due to its clinical, legal and ethical com-
plexity and seriousness.
Coercion in physician-assisted suicide
The British Geriatrics Society believes that elderly patients
are particularly vulnerable to coercion in PAS requests
[13]. The problem of coercion may be exacerbated by the
Joffe Bill's 'signature' criterion in which third parties can
sign for physically disabled and dependent patients. But
coercion potentially affects any PAS request and can do so
at any stage of the process. It can affect the decision to
request the overdose, whether the overdose is taken, and
how long the patient chooses to live between making the
request and overdosing. Coercion can be difficult for doc-
tors to detect, and even when detected it is sometimes
ignored despite guidelines (Table 2). The prevalence of
coercion in EAS requests is unknown since it is unstudied
and relatively few case histories [14-17] are described. But
before assuming that the examples of Table 2 are unusual,
it is useful to consider that Cases 2 and 4 were in the pub-
lic domain because pro-EAS societies suggested them for
newspaper and television documentaries, respectively,
implying that these cases are considered paragons of the
appropriate application of EAS.
Transference and countertransference in physician-
assisted suicide
Reasons that patients and doctors give for PAS such as
'dignity', 'autonomy' and 'control', have been extensively
documented. In this section, I attempt to balance the wide
recognition given to these reasons with an overview of
some less recognized forces that can affect PAS decision-
making: transference and countertransference. Transfer-
ence and countertransference feelings are normal and can
occur in any doctor-patient relationship. When these feel-
ings heighten around emotionally intense issues, they can
exert coercive pressure on clinical decision-making with
an obligatory quality that is difficult to resist. Recognition
is complicated by the frequent involvement of unaccepta-
ble feelings and urges that both doctor and patient wish to
deny. That specialized training is needed to systematically
recognize transference-countertransference may underlie
the finding that Dutch GPs are worse than Dutch psychia-
trists at recognizing when transference or countertransfer-
ence has affected a request for EAS [18]. A survey of Dutch
psychiatrists found that transference and countertransfer-
ence influenced doctor-patient decision-making in 25%
of all EAS requests for which psychiatric consultation was
sought. Transference and countertransference influenced
19% of cases in which the request for PAS or euthanasia
Table 1: Some differences between physician-assisted suicide criteria in Oregon and in Lord Joffe's Bill
What constitutes a 'signature' on the written request declaration
Oregon & Lord Joffe's Bill: Signed by the patient.
Lord Joffe's Bill: OR patient leaves his mark OR third party signs at patient's direction if patient 
cannot due to physical infirmity.
Degree of assistance from the doctor in the suicide
Oregon & Lord Joffe's Bill: Doctor prescribes overdose.
Lord Joffe's Bill: OR Doctor prescribes overdose and provides the means for patient to self-administer 
if patient cannot take overdose orally.BMC Family Practice 2006, 7:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/7/39
Page 4 of 17
(page number not for citation purposes)
was granted, despite the advice of the consultant [18]. This
study demonstrates the importance of transference and
countertransference as potentially distorting forces in PAS
requests but does not describe the prevalence of specific
forms of transference and countertransference. This sec-
tion outlines potential forms of transference and counter-
transference that can influence decision-making even in
apparently patient-generated PAS requests [19] and pro-
vides examples from cases of PAS and euthanasia.
Transference is when a patient relates to the doctor in a
way that primarily replicates other important, usually
parental, relationships. It frequently acts on an uncon-
scious level to covertly affect the patient-doctor interac-
tion. As a general example, patients may relate to the
doctor as an omnipotent parental authority figure. Their
communications and behaviour may express a wish for
approval, a wish for comfort and restoration, fear of aban-
donment, or rage at perceived abandonment [20]. In any
suicidal patient, including the terminally ill, the request to
die can be a plea for help or an attempt to be given a rea-
son to live. A request for PAS can be an entreaty for the
doctor to take the terminally ill patient's situation or
despair more seriously, or a test of the doctor's true feel-
ings about the patient's value now that he is nearing death
[19,20]. One patient's request for euthanasia was
described as "the patient's way of 'testing' the medical
team...to make sure they would not be abandoned. Moreover,
as the patient had a difficult relationship with their family –
who had asked for euthanasia to be carried out – this request
enabled the patient to hear that they still had a certain value in
the eyes of the medical team" (pp 592) [21]. Another exam-
ple is that of Mr. C., a 72-year-old man with severe
obstructive lung disease. This patient asked his doctor,
"Can't you do something to just bring it to an end? ...Just put
me out of my misery. It would save everyone a lot of trouble."
His doctor replied rather awkwardly, "Even though you feel like
a burden, I can't do that." Mr. C. asks, "Why not? You'd do it
for your dog." His doctor answers, "Because you aren't a dog,
Mr. C. You're my patient and I'm your doctor, and I'm trying
to help you. And I'll keep trying to help you as long as I have
to." Mr. C. took the doctor's hand in both of his and said,
"Thank God. I thought everyone had given up on me" (pp 67–
68) [17]. The authors suggest that the doctor was power-
fully influential at this vulnerable point in the patient's
life, related to the transference of feelings about early care-
takers onto the doctor and the doctor's role as caretaker.
They propose that if the doctor had taken a neutral role or
agreed, there would have been a different outcome. Cer-
tainly not all patients who request PAS are looking for
reassurance of their value, but careful exploration of the
patient's motivations, needs and wishes is clearly critical
in order to avoid readily confirming a patient's dimin-
ished sense of worth and for a real understanding of what
is at stake for a patient who requests PAS.
For some patients, the PAS request can be a paradoxical
attempt to regain control over life by setting the condi-
tions for death [19,20,22]. Patients with amyotrophic lat-
eral sclerosis (ALS, also known as motor neuron disease or
MND in the UK) have an increased perception of control
over their disease management if they choose to hasten
death [23]. The intense drive and motivation that some
patients have for PAS can overwhelm doctors with a sense
of urgency, momentum, and a sense of losing control.
These very determined patients can have a powerful effect
on doctors, and potentially on doctors' decisions: "I've
always sort of felt like patients should be in charge, but he was
in charge of a process that I wasn't that familiar with" (pp 455)
[24]. "And I remember thinking that it's kind of like a lot of
Table 2: Cases of coercion in physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia
Case 1, Oregon: An 85-year-old cancer patient with worsening dementia requests PAS but her psychiatrist believes that she is being pressured by 
family. Nevertheless, she is then approved for PAS by a psychologist and receives assisted suicide [16].
Case 2, Oregon: Louise, who has a degenerative neurological disease, requests PAS. As her disease progresses, those in her network who 
support her suicide become increasingly anxious that she will become too mentally or physically incapacitated to act on her request. This includes 
her doctor, her mother, a friend who will be present at her suicide, and the Oregon Compassion in Dying PAS advocate who has arranged for a 
New York Times reporter to fly in and cover the suicide. Louise says she is almost ready but not quite. She wants a week to relax and be with her 
mother. On learning indirectly that her doctor thinks she will not be able to act if she waits, she appears startled. Her mother tells her, "It's OK to 
be afraid." She replies: "I'm not afraid. I just feel as if everyone is ganging up on me, pressuring me. I just want some time" [15].
Case 3, The Netherlands: A wife who no longer wishes to care for her sick, elderly husband gives him a choice between euthanasia and 
admission to a nursing home. Afraid of being left to the mercy of strangers in an unfamiliar place, he chooses euthanasia. His doctor ends his life 
despite being aware that the request was coerced [14].
Case 4, The Netherlands: Cees requests euthanasia one month after being diagnosed with ALS (MND). As required, his request is assessed by 
the primary doctor who will carry out the euthanasia and by a consultant. During their assessments, both doctors allow Cees's apparently resentful 
wife to answer all the questions directed to him, even though his speech is still understandable and he can type on a computer. His ambivalence 
about euthanasia is expressed by repeatedly pushing the date back. It is also expressed by weeping in response to the doctor's pro forma question 
of whether Cees is sure he wants to go ahead with euthanasia. His wife quickly answers affirmatively for him and then tells the doctor to move 
away from Cees, saying it is better to let him cry alone. At no point does a doctor ask to talk with Cees alone before his euthanasia [15].BMC Family Practice 2006, 7:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/7/39
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things, you get your nose into the tent, and then the next thing
you know, here you are in the middle of this thing, and it kind
of takes on a mind of it's own" (pp 456) [24]. "It was like talk-
ing to a locomotive. It was like talking to Superman when he's
going after a train" (pp 196) [25]. "In these cases it's just
"boom" a patient walks in the door and "boom" you are right
up there on this incredible interaction. It's very powerful emo-
tionally" (pp 456) [24]. As described in the last quote, the
effect of being swept up is not necessarily unpleasant for
doctors, but some doctors regretted that they ended up
involved in the logistics of PAS before fully understanding
the reasons for the patient's wish to commit suicide [24].
Some medically ill patients can experience a split or frag-
mented sense of self in which the 'sick' or 'bad' part of the
self is felt to be alien, with the feeling 'I don't know the
person I've become' or 'This isn't me' [20]. One man in a
study of EAS attitudes in patients with HIV or AIDS
described dying slowly, "a little piece at a time" (pp 363)
[26]. In such cases, a request to die may express the fantasy
of killing off the bad self, leaving the healthy self to sur-
vive or be reborn [20]. PAS requests may express rage: rage
at the doctor for distancing himself or for not providing a
cure, rage at the world, or rage at themselves. Rage can
induce a wish for revenge with fantasies of harming others
by dying [19,20]. EAS requests based on revenge have
been documented in palliative care patients [21]. Guilt
may motivate PAS requests in patients who equate their
illness with personal failure. For example, it has been sug-
gested that a patient might attribute her cancer to unac-
ceptable emotions or bad deeds and a PAS request could
reflect the need for self-punishment and atonement
[19,20]. In one case, a teacher with end-stage AIDS is
allowed through his doctor's exploration of his suicide
wish to reveal how exhausted he is by trying to "be a role
model" and "put on a good face" for others (pp 216–217) [27].
It would seem that he may feel guilty or ashamed at not
living up to the perceived standards of others, and suicide
allows him to save face. The author's [27] description of
how the doctor's social intervention facilitated the patient
and his loved ones adapting to his changed needs is an
excellent example of how doctors might deal construc-
tively with a terminally ill patient's wish for suicide. Not
every request for PAS is determined by psychodynamics,
but this cannot be known unless the doctor has the train-
ing and capacity to consider these possibilities and to talk
with the patient in depth. To act on a PAS request because
the patient is judged rational and competent without
exploring the possible hidden meanings of the request is
simplistic and can ignore the patient's unspoken needs
[20].
Countertransference, the mirror image of transference, is
when a doctor reacts to the patient based on his or her
own intrapsychic issues or background. It is generally
assumed that doctors can accurately assess patients'
requests for PAS apart from their own intrapsychic con-
flicts and personal history. However, it has been cau-
tioned that countertransference can affect doctors'
assessments of PAS requests, potentially leading to errors
in classifying patients as appropriate or inappropriate for
assisted suicide [19]. Doctors who are affected by counter-
transference or who have psychologically committed
themselves to PAS may be prone to accepting patients' rea-
sons for PAS at face value without thorough exploration
[28,29], as illustrated by the following examples. An Ore-
gon doctor who provides PAS said, "... I learned it very
quickly... trying to talk somebody out of it or to really assess
their motivation... the patients were quite resentful of that.
Pretty quickly I could take at face value what they're saying and
then spend most of the rest of the time exploring with them how
they understand about their options" (pp 458) [24]. Patients
and their family members described doctors who were
willing to prescribe a lethal overdose but who avoided dis-
cussing the patient's motivations or state of mind in
requesting PAS. A wife said, "My husband, with the advice of
a doctor friend that lives in [another state], went to his cardi-
ologist...And he told the doctor that he needed Seconal. And
this doctor has known my husband for a long time, and all he
said was, 'I trust you have a good reason', and gave it to him, a
prescription for it" (pp 1261) [30]. In a more extreme exam-
ple, a family member found that after a visit with the
patient's oncologist, the prescription for a lethal overdose
had been tucked into her bag secretly during the appoint-
ment [30]. A case report of a man with terminal lung can-
cer is notable for the difference between assessments of
his psychiatric history by clinicians who prioritized PAS
and by clinicians who prioritized treatment (Table 3)
[16].
One of the commonest countertransference reactions is
over-identification with the patient. Doctors treating ter-
minally ill patients can experience 'pseudoempathy', feel-
ing the patient's suicidal wish is 'normal' and that they
would feel the same way [20,29]. Doctors often over-iden-
tify with strong-willed, determined patients in PAS, as
found in an Oregon study [24]. It is not always evident
when 'identification' becomes 'over-identification'. For
example, doctors working with HIV patients in the San
Francisco Bay area were more likely to have assisted a sui-
cide if they identified their sexual orientation as gay, les-
bian or bisexual [31]. The authors believe this finding
could have two explanations: The doctor's sexual orienta-
tion may facilitate a therapeutic identification, allowing a
better understanding of the patient's situation, or it may
contribute to over-identification that distorts doctor-
patient decision-making around the patient's PAS request.
Two psychiatrists [32,33] analyzed a case of PAS as
reported by Dr. Timothy Quill, an American internal med-BMC Family Practice 2006, 7:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/7/39
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icine physician who is a PAS proponent. Early in his advo-
cacy for PAS, Quill published articles [34,35] and a book
[36] about assisting the suicide of a patient, Diane. Diane
requested PAS soon after being diagnosed with leukae-
mia, with a 1 in 4 chance of survival with treatment. She
told Quill how she was enraged at the oncologist's
assumption that she wanted treatment and she was con-
vinced that she would die during treatment. Diane asked
Quill for PAS saying she wanted to be in control. Wesley
[33] and Hendin [32] argue that Quill's over-identifica-
tion with Diane and her need for control led to his rapid
acceptance of her request for PAS, without exploring why
she wished so desperately for control. Quill's over-identi-
fication can be seen in one of his articles about this patient
when he asserts, "Diane was a friend as well as a patient"
(pp1039)  [35]. The titles of Quill's publications on
Diane's case reinforce the impression that he values PAS
as an expression of control and autonomy: 'Death and
dignity: a case of individualized decision making' [34]
and 'Death and Dignity: Making Choices and Taking
Charge' [36]. Wesley [33] interprets that Quill's assump-
tion that Diane's request "made perfect sense" (pp 693)
[34], and his quick response to Diane's PAS request with
a referral to the Hemlock Society, may have conveyed the
message that he agreed "if you cannot be fully independent,
you are better off dead" (pp 483) [33]. Quill's familiarity
with the Hemlock Society, which was known to few doc-
tors at the time, is proposed to imply that Quill had a pre-
existing interest in PAS that may have influenced how he
dealt with this patient's request [33]. Certainly Wesley's
point is a fair one: "It is not a neutral act to refer a patient
contemplating suicide to the Hemlock Society..." (pp 483)
[33]. Similarly, it has been suggested that doctors may
influence patients' decisions when doctors explicitly sug-
gest PAS, as is common in the Netherlands [14].
As with many patients who request PAS, doctors can have
a low tolerance for situations they cannot control. It is
especially difficult to endure a terminally ill patient's suf-
fering and to bear his distress [29,37,38]. In a survey, 44%
of doctors admitted that they found the anxiety of a termi-
nally ill patient sometimes unbearable [39]. Lack of
knowledge about what to do may lead doctors to 'do
something' by assisting suicide. The less knowledge doc-
tors have of palliative care, the more they support EAS
[40,41]. Once doctors know how to alleviate suffering in
terminal cases and no longer feel helpless, support for PAS
in those cases recedes [14]. Oncologists have described
providing terminal care and the associated frustration and
sense of failure due to limited therapeutic success as major
factors in job burnout [42]. Hendin [14] suggests that
some doctors, unaware of palliative care alternatives and
unable to tolerate lack of control, may attempt to regain
their illusion of mastery over disease and to alleviate their
sense of helplessness or failure by taking an active role in
the PAS process, making death a medical decision. Rene
Diekstra, a pioneer of PAS in the Netherlands, described
how some doctors coming before a committee that
reviewed PAS cases were prematurely ready to provide
PAS when feelings of helplessness about the patient's con-
dition influenced them to overestimate the rationality or
inevitability of the patient's suicide [32]. Fear of inade-
quacy and of abandoning patients by denying the PAS
request can be observed in Dobscha et al.'s [24] interviews
Table 3: Clinical and legal complexity in a request for physician-assisted suicide
Mr. A, a 63-year-old Oregonian, called a PAS helpline to request PAS the day he received a diagnosis of terminal lung cancer. He was distraught and 
saw no purpose in chemotherapy, saying "I might as well end it". The worker informed him that he had actually called a group offering support and 
palliative care for individuals considering PAS. He ended up discussing his concerns and described having suicidal feelings that first began after his 
mother committed suicide when he was 21. After her death, he attempted suicide 3 times and was treated for depression in a psychiatric hospital. 
With the worker's support, he decided to get treatment for his depression from his GP and to start chemotherapy and radiation treatment which 
alleviated his physical symptoms. He disclosed his diagnosis to his daughter, who became involved.
One year later, he obtained a PAS prescription from a doctor who had actively publicized assisting the suicide of a depressed patient, and who did 
not consider a psychiatric consultation to be "necessary" for Mr. A. Another doctor associated with the PAS movement was in contact with Mr. A 
to discuss the PAS option. When asked if this doctor knew of his psychiatric history, Mr. A replied that they "didn't get into that. Our conversations 
were superficial".
Six months later, Mr. A was admitted involuntarily to a psychiatric ward for suicidal and homicidal thoughts. In addition to being diagnosed with a 
depressive disorder and narcissistic personality traits, he was diagnosed with intermittent delirium, probably from his numerous sedative 
medications. During his hospitalization, some of his doctors did not provide comprehensive psychiatric assessment or treatment, seeming to 
compartmentalize his suicidal symptoms under the rubric of PAS. Prior to his discharge, although firearms were removed from his house based on 
his risk to self and others, and guardianship was set up due to his "periods of confusion and impaired judgement", his treating doctors did not 
remove the assisted suicide drugs prescribed by the PAS doctor because they were unsure of their legal right to do so. Mr. A had now long outlived 
his original prognosis of 6 months, so a PAS doctor gave him a new prognosis of 6 months to live so that his assisted suicide would be "legal".
Mr. A's suicidal urge receded, but returned 3 weeks before his death when he experienced pain from constipation and from stopping his pain 
medicine in the midst of confusion and paranoia. He was desperate from the pain and on the verge of taking the overdose. His PAS doctor offered 
to sit with him while he took it. His GP and palliative care worker offered him reassurance, rehydration and a morphine pump. He accepted these 
interventions and his confusion, pain, fear and suicidality quickly cleared. He was much relieved in the remaining weeks of his life despite his physical 
deterioration [16].BMC Family Practice 2006, 7:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/7/39
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with Oregon doctors. One doctor favorable to PAS said,
"...I think I would just feel really uncomfortable if I couldn't
help" (pp 455) [24]. Whether or not a doctor chooses to
provide PAS, the patient's request for PAS can be perceived
as a rejection or a condemnation of the doctor's inade-
quacy. As one doctor said, "It's almost as if your treatments
and attempts to make the patient comfortable have been a com-
plete failure if they're going to ask for that" (pp 455) [24]. And
another: "I feel like there's something with physician assisted
suicide, personally, where I see it as a rejection of care...some-
how the patient is saying, 'Whatever you're doing isn't good
enough. It's not meeting my needs."' (pp 455) [24].
Some doctors feel deep disgust towards disease and can
have a profound fear of death and the helplessness that
accompanies illness. Dr. Lewis Thomas writes, in an unu-
sually naked portrayal of these feelings, "Death is shocking,
dismaying, even terrifying...A dying patient is a kind of
freak...an offense against nature itself" [43]. Some individu-
als become doctors as a way of dealing with their death
anxiety [44,45]. Doctors' fears of death and of other issues
around PAS can contribute to their avoiding much-
needed discussions with patients about their impending
death, both in doctors who support and who reject PAS.
An Oregon doctor said about a PAS request, "I kind of dealt
with the medical issues and I didn't square up with it...I
avoided it" (pp 454) [24]. This reaction can lead to doctors
giving PAS prescriptions to patients without adequate
evaluation [30], as described earlier. But importantly, this
can also lead doctors who are against PAS to reject any dis-
cussion about death with the patient; in some cases the
doctor severs the relationship altogether in reaction to a
PAS request [46]. For example, a patient terminally ill
with cancer "described how she could detect that her oncologist
became "really uncomfortable" talking about PAS or "any-
thing" about dying, and she changed the subject for him. She
said, "I learned that he's a baseball fan and much more com-
fortable if I change the topic to baseball...It's awful when you
have to try to make them feel comfortable, but that's the way it
is" (pp 1260) [30]. In the case of another patient, who
wept with frustration as she described trying to get her
doctor "to sit down and listen", "Her clinician's unwillingness
to discuss PAS resulted in missed opportunities to connect with
this patient's deepest concerns, which included her quality of
life, her prognosis, and her suffering" (pp 1261) [30].
Back et al. [30] observed that terminally ill patients used
talking about PAS as a gateway to talking about dying and
that a therapeutic relationship was often more important
to patients interested in PAS than a lethal prescription.
Whether or not doctors provided PAS, therapeutic rela-
tionships could be maintained based on open communi-
cation and on the doctor setting clear boundaries for his
or her role [30], and, it would seem, on the doctor keeping
the focus on the patient's feelings and needs rather than
on the doctor's feelings about PAS. Meier et al. [47] give
another example of how doctors who choose not to pro-
vide PAS can shut down their patients' attempts to discuss
their impending death : "Mrs T, a 55-year-old successful law-
yer, had struggled with progressive renal cancer for several years
and was increasingly distressed by her progressive dependency
and feelings of isolation. She asked her doctor for advice on
ending her life, saying that she "just [couldn't] take it any
more." Her doctor recalls feeling distressed by her request and
her evident despair and ill equipped to explore the reasons for it
with her. Instead, she tried to encourage her, saying that she
didn't believe in helping her patients die and that now was not
the time to give up hope. "You are a fighter and I know that you
want to beat this." She closed the visit by saying, "Hang in
there," and then gave the patient a pat on the back. Mrs
T...took an overdose of sleeping pills 1 week later" (pp 3011)
[47]. The authors suggest that the doctor's discomfort with
both her patient's desperation and the request for PAS
interfered with exploring the patient's reasons for the
request, and may have left the patient feeling alone and
without options.
Doctors can experience PAS very positively. Many in an
Oregon study emphasized how involvement in PAS
caused them to become better at talking about death and
providing palliative care [24]. That the PAS request func-
tions as the means towards having an open discussion
about the patient's death echoes reports by patients and
families who seek PAS [30]. Both studies [24,30] give the
impression that for doctors who participate in PAS, PAS is
the necessary stimulus to deal with death in a way that is
meaningful and adequate for patients, and the doctors
thereafter associate provision of PAS with the gratifying
experiences of mastering death and of achieving a special
relationship with their patients. The studies also give the
impression that doctors who do not provide PAS often
continue to avoid talking about death altogether. This pat-
tern raises the question of whether most doctors do a dis-
service to patients if a PAS request is considered the
necessary basis for addressing patients' needs around their
death.
As another way of positively experiencing PAS, one doctor
described the pleasure of embracing death while control-
ling its process so that it is done 'right' through PAS: "You
know, it's an odd thing, and you've probably heard this from
other physicians, but if you don't sidestep the process of dying,
it becomes almost as pleasurable a thing helping people die right
as giving birth...And done well, the process of helping somebody
die right is very rewarding" (pp 458) [24]. This doctor's
interesting equation of death with birth, two biological
opposites, hints at an avoidance of the finality of death
through using the fantasy of death as a 'rebirth'. The fan-
tasy of reunion after death is another way that doctors and
patients can deny the finality of death, as described inBMC Family Practice 2006, 7:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/7/39
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cases of PAS [32,33]. In a Dutch case that was highly pub-
licized because PAS was used for psychological distress
without any physical illness, a bereaved mother
demanded PAS from a psychoanalytically trained psychi-
atrist, Dr. Chabot, saying that she felt "pulled to her boys"
(pp 146) [32]. One son had died by suicide and the other
by cancer. As 'Netty' drank her overdose of barbiturates
during her PAS, she lay on her younger dead son's bed in
his room with photographs of both dead sons next to her.
Dr. Chabot suggested to her, "Think of your boys" (pp 149)
[32] as she lost consciousness. It seemed that Dr. Chabot
had colluded with his patient's fantasy of reunion after
death [32]. In another case [32,33], Diane, whom Dr.
Quill had provided with a prescription for a lethal dose of
barbiturates, came to say goodbye before her suicide,
promising him "a reunion in the future at her favourite spot
on the edge of Lake Geneva, with dragons shining in the sun-
set" (pp 693) [34]. In the conclusion of his account of her
PAS and of his participation, Quill writes that he wonders
if he "will see Diane again, on the shore of Lake Geneva at sun-
set, with dragons swimming on the horizon" (pp 694) [34].
Some doctors share with their patient, or experience uni-
laterally, an intense sense of closeness and intimacy
through PAS, as Hendin [32] proposes that Dr. Quill and
Dr. Chabot did while assisting in their patients' suicides.
A Dutch palliative care physician, Dr. Cohen, who esti-
mated that he had performed euthanasia somewhere
between 50 to 100 times and had consulted in many
more, was asked why he became so involved with eutha-
nasia. He replied, "There is satisfaction in being involved in
the terminal phase of life. You become part of a family...There
is a special warmth and intimacy and harmony" (pp 137–138)
[32]. Dr. Cohen knew that some might find it strange, but
he would often bring a bouquet of flowers to the euthana-
sia appointment [32]. A doctor's need for closeness can
sometimes be intrusive to the patient or family. In the
opinion of one family member, their PAS doctor "lacked
boundaries" (pp 1262) [30]. This doctor had an intense
relationship with the patient that included daily tele-
phone calls and home visits. On the night the patient
attempted PAS, the doctor carried out a backup plan after
the oral overdose failed. The family member recounts that
after the patient's death, " [The physician] would go over to
the hospital to see a patient, and she'd call me at 10 o'clock PM
and say she wanted to come over [to our house] and sit in the
room where he died and 'hang out.' And I'd say no, and she'd
come over anyway" (pp 1262–1263) [30]. After a couple of
these incidents, the relative wrote to the doctor requesting
no more contact because he felt burdened by her behav-
iour [30].
An assumption underlying the proposal that doctors, and
only doctors, be legally sanctioned to assist suicide is that
doctors are beneficent. Undercutting this assumption is
another long-documented form of countertransference
experienced by doctors: hatred of the patient, often
expressed in the guise of love [29,48]. The effect of hostile
countertransference on doctors' decision-making has
been described in regard to patients in general [48] and
with suicidal patients specifically [49]. Hostile counter-
transference can potentially affect doctors who accede to
PAS requests and doctors who refuse them. I outline the
theoretical origins and effects of hostile countertransfer-
ence for PAS here, and follow this with an examination of
possible hostile countertransference in two cases of PAS.
A doctor may resent the drain of terminally ill and suicidal
patients on his time and emotions. He may unconsciously
act out caregivers' aggressive feelings or distress, which can
stem from exhaustion, their own over-identification with
the patient, or hostility [19,29]. On a deeper level, a doc-
tors' inability to cure can threaten his or her fantasy of
omnipotence and provoke a sense of inadequacy, and this
can trigger rage or hatred toward the patient [19,29,50].
Doctors may deal with countertransference hostility in a
number of ways: They may attempt to disavow or counter-
act their hostility by becoming over-involved. They may
feel obligated to accede to the patient's request for PAS.
Doctors who disagree with PAS may abandon the patient,
both therapeutically and emotionally. Doctors may trans-
gress professional boundaries normally maintained. They
may distance themselves and ignore opportunities to reas-
sure the patient's fears or to explore his ambivalence
about death and suicide. Some may simply act out their
hostility by contributing to the patient's suicide
[19,29,50]. For doctors in general, the understandable
need to deny aggressive urges makes it particularly diffi-
cult for them to recognize this reaction to patients: "In
some way we are always reassuring ourselves that our motives
are beyond question because we have chosen to spend our days
in the business of understanding others and helping them to
improve their lives" (pp 253) [50].
During my search for examples of countertransference, I
found no published analyses of hostile countertransfer-
ence affecting EAS decisions. This could be due to a self-
reporting bias against disclosing a taboo feeling, possible
low participation of doctors with hostile countertransfer-
ence in studies of doctors' characteristics in EAS, or per-
haps because hostile countertransference is rare in the
situation of EAS. I did find two accounts by doctors of
their participation in PAS that suggest possible elements
of hostile countertransference.
In his paper, 'The ambiguity of clinical intentions' [35],
Dr. Timothy Quill explores his motivations in assisting
the suicide of his patient. He asks, "What were some of my
true intentions in prescribing barbiturates for Diane?" In his
exact words, number 3 on his list of 'intentions' is this: "3.BMC Family Practice 2006, 7:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/7/39
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To cause her death (to kill her). Diane was a friend as well as
a patient. I wanted her to be able to live as long as she could
find any meaning in her life, and then to die as peacefully as
possible. I had no desire to determine the time or to be the agent
of her death, and to say that I intended to kill her is outrageous.
Yet, why the barbiturates? There are much safer drugs for sleep.
My intentions must have been more complex" (pp 1039–1040)
[35].
In the above passage, Dr. Quill demonstrates his ambiva-
lence about facing the nature of, as he later puts it, his
"multilayered intentions" (pp 1040) [35]. He first states that
he intended "to kill her", then immediately disavows this
intention with the disclaimer, "to say that I intended to kill
her is outrageous". His prescription, which was specifically
given for and calculated to be a lethal overdose, is contem-
plated as something "to cause death (to kill her)", then "for
sleep", then acknowledged as something that is 'not safe
for sleep' (pp 1039–1040) [35]. What Quill does not write
is interesting as well. He does not write that it was 'as
though' or 'as if' he intended to kill her. He specifically
writes that he 'intended' to kill her. Another intention he
identifies is, "5. To allow her to kill herself" (pp 1040) [35].
But his intention, "3. To cause her death (to kill her)" is dis-
tinct from this. It stands alone and comes higher on his
list. At no point in his paper does Quill write that he feels
hatred or rage towards Diane or towards what she may
have symbolized to him. But to intentionally kill some-
one is surely one of the most hostile acts possible, and
from his own account it appears that assisting Diane's sui-
cide had, on some level and to some degree, this meaning
for Dr. Quill. As he summarizes, "...multilayered intentions
are present in most, if not all, end-of-life decisions" (pp 1040)
[35].
Dr. Jack Kevorkian is a pathologist who carried out a con-
frontational and exhibitionistic crusade for PAS in the
United States for a decade until his sentence for second-
degree murder in 1999 for assisting the suicide of a man
with ALS (MND), an event broadcast on national televi-
sion. His style and methods in providing PAS to a series of
patients were so repugnant and bizarre that, with few
exceptions [51], those on both sides of the PAS debate
share an almost visceral aversion to referring to him in dis-
cussions of PAS. Certainly he is not representative of the
average doctor who provides PAS. However, examination
of his case is informative in terms of possible manifesta-
tions of countertransference in PAS. The following dia-
logue is quoted from a verbatim transcript of the
videotape Dr. Kevorkian made of his meeting with Marjo-
rie Wantz, Sherry Miller and their families to plan the
assisted suicides of the two women the next day [52]. The
videotape was made with their knowledge and broadcast
over television. Marjorie Wantz was a 58-year-old woman
with chronic pelvic pain and Sherry Miller was a 43-year-
old woman with progressive multiple sclerosis. An edited
version of their dialogue is presented in Table 4 with
phrases italicized for emphasis.
In his meeting, Dr. Kevorkian moves from the beginnings
of a well-structured examination of the goals and under-
standing of these two women and their families about
their wish for PAS. These individuals seem to be deeply
relieved and grateful that they have found a doctor to end
their suffering. Then, in a disorienting shift, Kevorkian
moves the group's focus onto what is clearly an essential
part of his agenda in providing PAS: his interest in organ
donation and human experimentation. I believe that in
terms of countertransference, the real interest here is not
in his bizarre preoccupation, but rather in how he relates
to these two women and what role he designates them in
the context of his preoccupation, of which PAS is part.
Interestingly, he couches his proposition in a caricature of
patient autonomy, offering "choices", "maximum latitude in
choosing",  "options", and "self determination". The most
revealing phrases he uses seem to be these: "Sherry's liver
could save two babies." "Our death is really valueless, it's neg-
ative..." When Sherry and Marjorie just want PAS, they
'just want to get out quick', he counters, "Sure... some peo-
ple would say, 'What do I owe society?"' "...you don't feel an
obligation to other people. I can see your reasoning there.
There's no judgment at all on my part" (Table 4). It seems
that to Kevorkian, these two women are 'valueless' and
'negative' in their death. Their only value is if they allow
themselves to be disassembled into their useful parts, as
one would recycle the salvageable parts of a wrecked car.
He almost seems impatient, and resentful, that they cling
to pieces of themselves that they can't use anyway. In
Kevorkian's written description to accompany a painting
he did that shows a man clawing at the sides of a chasm as
he falls screaming into a black void, Kevorkian writes,
"This depicts how most human beings feel about dying...Most
of us will do anything to thwart the inevitable victory of biolog-
ical death...pleading wantonly and unashamedly, clutching
any hope of salvation through medicine or prayer..." [53]. My
sense is that the main feeling that Kevorkian conveys
through his relating to Marjorie and Sherry, and through
his reaction to the human terror of death, is contempt. He
may affirm his patients' lack of fear and their wish to 'just
get out' instead of 'clutching on', but he seems more to
resent that they are not willing to abrogate themselves
completely and on his terms. Freud commented that the
opposite of love is indifference rather than hate [54]. It
seems as if his two patients are not real enough to Kevor-
kian for him to hate them personally. But what they sym-
bolize to him, the situation of contending with
helplessness and terror in the face of death, is perhaps
something that he reacts to with a deep hostility. On hos-
tility and contempt, Gabbard [48] suggests that contempt
can provide a self preservative function. A doctor mightBMC Family Practice 2006, 7:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/7/39
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regard a patient with contempt as a way of exaggerating
the differences between themselves and their patient in
order to preserve their own identity and separateness (pp.
89) [48]. Kevorkian's most real relationship may be with
his own death anxiety rather than with his patients.
Medicine, a profession dedicated to helping others, can
provide an ideal opportunity to conceal sadism [50]. It is
not unusual for altruistic individuals to have chosen the
field of medicine as a defense against their own aggres-
sion, that is, to keep from hurting others [44]. Patients are
generally protected from doctors acting on urges to kill by
the ethical and legal boundaries prohibiting killing, to the
extent that this is considered a non-issue in medicine
apart from rare, deviant cases. The legal sanctioning of
doctors to assist patients in killing themselves may create
a new, undesirable conduit for the expression of hostile
countertransference. Because of the difficulty of recogniz-
ing transference and countertransference in general, many
doctors will deny or be unaware when these forces play a
role in PAS decisions and monitoring is inherently com-
promised. Of additional concern, it has been found that
even when transference or countertransference is recog-
nized as driving patients' requests for EAS, with psychia-
trists involved in the assessment process, it is not unusual
for the patient's request for EAS to be granted anyway
[18].
Unrecognized depression in terminal illness and physician-
assisted suicide
The PAS criteria for Oregon, the Netherlands and Lord
Joffe's bill assume that a doctor assessing mental capacity
will recognize depression and appreciate its influence on
a patient's request for assisted suicide. Those who rely on
this safeguard to prevent the provision of PAS to clinically
depressed, suicidal patients further assume that when
depression is recognized, PAS will not proceed. The evi-
dence suggests that these assumptions are ill-founded.
After training on depression, UK GPs recognize depres-
sion in only 39% of all depressed patients attending their
practices [55]. Specialists are not necessarily better. Oncol-
ogists recognize 33% of mild-to-moderate cases of depres-
sion and only 13% of severe depression cases in their
cancer patients [56], and nurses similarly under-identify
severe depression in this group [57,58]. Recognizing
depression in suicidal patients can be complicated by the
phenomenon that having decided on suicide, some indi-
viduals appear far from incompetent to make treatment
Table 4: Extracts from the transcript of Dr. Jack Kevorkian's videotape of his meeting with Marjorie Wantz and Sherry Miller to 
arrange their physician-assisted suicides [52]
Dr. Kevorkian begins the meeting by identifying each patient, friend and family member present. He systematically checks with each patient and 
family member on their wishes, feelings and understanding of the situation. He confirms for the record that the patients wrote to him, that they 
clearly understand assisted suicide means they will die, that this is what they definitely want and that their wish has been consistent. Each woman is 
very clear that PAS will result in her death and that she wants to die. The patients and their families recount their struggles with the illness, previous 
suicide attempts gone wrong, and how they came to ask Dr. Kevorkian for assisted suicide. The general sense from this part of the transcript is that 
the patients and families are definite about wanting assisted suicide and that they are deeply relieved and grateful that this doctor is going to provide 
it. Kevorkian repeatedly checks with each woman, "Are you afraid at all? Do you have any fears?"
At this point, there is an abrupt shift when Kevorkian changes the focus of the group by beginning, "I think there should be several options for 
people...The one option is to humanely, quickly and painlessly to have life ended, that's one option...The second option is for example, let's take 
Sherry's case. Now Sherry has got a good heart and good organs, except the central nervous system. And I ask patients – I do this routinely 
because it's just sort of a research project...The second option...which is donating organs. Now, Marge you probably could have that option too. 
How old are you?" Marge replies, "Fifty-eight." Kevorkian goes on, "Very close to the limit of donating organs, though. And...you have an infectious 
process, too. Isn't that infected? So you probably couldn't donate organs, but Sherry could." "...Sherry's liver could save two babies...And the third 
option would apply to you and Sherry...It's a prolonged process in which you're put to sleep under anaesthesia like a hospital operation, routine 
operation. And you just won't wake up...Option three is to do an experiment and you would get choices there. See, I want to give the patient the maximum 
latitude in choosing value of life and death. As it is now, none of us really has a maximum opportunity to choose our value of our lives, and our death. 
Our death is really valueless, it's negative." "...So, these are options that patients should have because that maximizes the self determination."
Marjorie interjects, "What I want to know is..." and asks him a series of intent questions to make sure she will get a very detailed autopsy to find out 
what a doctor has "done wrong" to her during her pelvic surgeries. Kevorkian quickly brings the conversation back: "Now Marge, what would you 
pick?" and outlines again the "three options" of assisted suicide only, organ donation or experiments. Marge seems slightly thrown off, "I never have 
given it a thought, and I'm trying to think – [Kevorkian cuts her off] "You will have to think about it and we'll get back to you later on this. Sherry, 
what would you pick of the two options?" Sherry says, "I just want out...Although I've never really given it any thought." Others in the group 
become interested in Kevorkian's organ donation idea and start to ask detailed questions. Specific body parts are discussed in terms of their viability 
for organ donation: heart, central nervous system, kidneys, lungs, liver, eyes and corneas.
In response to Sherry's and Marjorie's choice of "We just want it quick, you know", Kevorkian several times assures them, "No one judges you that 
you just want a quick one. No one judges you. I mean, it's just the choice of a person himself or herself." "...Sure, that's understandable. And beside 
that, some people would say, "What do I owe society? It's done nothing for me." "I don't blame them for that..." "I understand your situation, when it's 
your own life and your own death, you don't feel an obligation to other people. I can see your reasoning there. There's no judgment at all on my part." 
Sherry's friend, Karen, now derails Kevorkian: "I'd like to know what's going to happen to Sherry after it's over." And the rest of the meeting moves 
into planning how to handle the media coverage and the logistics of the suicides the next day.BMC Family Practice 2006, 7:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/7/39
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decisions. Rather, they are calm and relaxed while laying
out an eminently cogent case for why they should be
hopeless and want suicide. As part of the negativity of
depression, a patient with a terminal illness may also den-
igrate palliative measures and dismiss the possibility of
relief, making suicide seem an even more 'obvious' choice
[19]. Depression can also affect the patient's perception of
the doctor: Depressed cancer patients are more likely than
non-depressed cancer patients to have increased trust in
doctors who mention euthanasia or PAS explicitly [59].
Detecting depression in patients requesting PAS is partic-
ularly difficult for several reasons. First, doctors providing
PAS are less likely to know the patient well due to the doc-
tor-shopping that can occur in the patient's search for
PAS. In Oregon, the median duration of the doctor-
patient relationship before death by assisted suicide is 8
weeks (range 0 to 678 weeks) [6]. Second, depression is
harder to diagnose in patients with terminal illnesses [37].
Depression is significantly overlooked and under-treated
in late-stage cancer [56,60] and is generally under-recog-
nized in palliative care settings [61,62]. Third, in severely
ill patients, even when low mood is recognized, doctors
tend to consider it 'normal': an understandable reaction to
the situation. This can lead to treatment not being initi-
ated or advanced [19] or to administration of EAS anyway,
particularly if the patient is elderly and has a serious phys-
ical illness [18,63]. There is reason to think that under-rec-
ognition of depression will be replicated in UK PAS
situations: UK GPs have been found to consider late-life
depression 'understandable' even in the absence of termi-
nal illness and to have a strong nihilism that nothing can
be done for these patients [64]. Furthermore, UK GPs
report that their treatment of depression is limited by their
skills and by lack of resources including referrals and time
[64,65].
Beyond the problem of recognizing depression, the influ-
ence of depression on the wish to die in terminally ill
patients can be underappreciated. In the debate about
PAS, individual studies are sometimes cited to argue either
that depression is associated with the desire for PAS, or
that it is not, depending on the study and on the individ-
ual's stance on PAS. In order to clarify the relationship
between depression and the wish for PAS, I searched and
found a total of 23 studies of terminally ill patients that
examined both depression and the wish for a hastened
death, including PAS or euthanasia, and that used a con-
trol group for comparison. These studies include the top
three diseases for which patients die by PAS rather than by
their illness: ALS (MND), HIV/AIDS, and cancer [6]. The
pattern that emerged was this: Fifteen of the 18 studies
that used a standardized measure of depression, whereby
the patient is asked a series of questions specifically to
identify a depressive illness, found that depression is sig-
nificantly associated with requests for PAS, euthanasia, or
the wish for a hastened death (83% of studies, 95% CI 61
to 94) [23,59,66-81]. In contrast, none of the four studies
that relied solely or predominantly on a clinician's or car-
egiver's impression of whether the patient had depression,
sometimes based on recall going back four years [82],
found any significant association between depression and
requests for PAS, euthanasia, or the wish for a hastened
death (0% of studies, 95% CI 0 to 0.5) [26,82-84]. One
study that used a standardized assessment had mixed
results, finding that depression was associated with
greater desire for a hastened death, but not with whether
the patient would consider asking for a PAS prescription
[85]. Reliance on clinicians' superficial impression of
depression is of questionable validity in studies examin-
ing the relationship between depression and the wish for
hastened death since it has been found repeatedly that cli-
nicians under-recognize depression in medically ill
patients, as described above. In conclusion, studies that
systematically assess depression in terminally ill individu-
als do not show that all requests for PAS arise from depres-
sion, but they do provide robust evidence that depression
plays a role in the desire for a hastened death, including
PAS or euthanasia, in a significant proportion of those
with terminal illness.
A description by Dutch researchers of their pre-study
hypothesis in regard to the relationship between depres-
sion and requests for euthanasia illustrates both the diffi-
culty of recognizing depression in terminally ill patients
and the clinical bias that can affect assessments of depres-
sion in the context of EAS: "Our clinical impression was that
such requests were well-considered decisions, thoroughly dis-
cussed with healthcare workers and family. We thought the
patients requesting euthanasia were more accepting their
impending death and we therefore expected them to be less
depressed. To our surprise, we found that a depressed mood was
associated with more requests" (pp 6611) [80]. Using stand-
ardized depression questionnaires, the authors found that
depressed cancer patients were four times more likely to
request euthanasia [80]. It is concerning that examination
of their data shows euthanasia proceeded on an unspeci-
fied number of these patients with identified depression,
without any indication of depression treatment or reas-
sessment of the euthanasia request.
As distinguished from depression, hopelessness is another
factor clearly associated with the wish for a hastened
death, PAS and euthanasia [23,66-68,71,75,81,86], and
can have a stronger effect than depression [71,86]. Pain
has not been found to play a significant role in the wish
for a hastened death [59,67,68,71,74,75,78], with the
exception of two studies [69,70]. In HIV/AIDS patients,
cognitive impairment has been associated with a wish for
hastened death [87]. It is not only the case that mental ill-BMC Family Practice 2006, 7:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/7/39
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ness or distress can affect requests for PAS. In turn,
requests for PAS can affect the quality of treatment of
mental illness and distress: Patients with mental illness
who then develop a terminal disease can receive substand-
ard treatment for their psychiatric relapses after requesting
PAS, partly because doctors become confused by the com-
peting interests of PAS and clinical care [16] (Table 3).
Decisions about physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia 
can change
Requests for EAS are often motivated by terror of what will
happen rather than by current symptoms [14,16,21]. Fac-
ing uncertainty, some patients fill the vacuum with fanta-
sies and fears. When fears and palliative care needs are
addressed, the request for an assisted death usually disap-
pears, as illustrated by specific cases [16,32,46]. But a ten-
dency to adhere to the minimum legal standards for
assessing mental capacity for PAS, and for doctors to cut
off discussion of PAS if they do not agree with the practice,
can cause missed opportunities for resolving the unneces-
sary fears that can motivate PAS requests, for example, a
patient's fear that she will be forced to have a feeding tube
[28] or the unnecessary fear of a man with ALS (MND)
that he will die in pain, with the sensation of burning legs,
and choking on his own secretions [46].
In the terminally ill, the desire to die has been found to
decrease over time [69]. Over two months, half of termi-
nally ill cancer patients had changed their minds about
wanting euthanasia or PAS. Decision instability was par-
ticularly associated with depressive symptoms [70]. Anti-
depressant treatment can alleviate the desire for death due
to major depression even in terminally ill patients [88]. In
addition to antidepressants, effective depression treat-
ments in the terminally ill include rapid-acting psychos-
timulants, electroconvulsive therapy and focused
psychotherapy [89-92]. Improvement in depression is
generally accompanied by an increased desire for life-sus-
taining interventions in the elderly and the terminally ill
[93-96]. In the Netherlands, pain alleviation resulted in
85% of patients withdrawing their requests for EAS [97].
In an Oregon study of PAS requests, 46% of patients who
received substantive palliative interventions changed their
minds about assisted suicide, as compared to 15% of
patients who received no substantive intervention. Inter-
ventions had been implemented in about half of instances
where they were recommended [98]. Delirium can affect
mental capacity and decision stability in PAS [16]. Delir-
ium can be present in up to 85% of patients in the final
stages of cancer, yet is often misdiagnosed or unrecog-
nized by non-psychiatric doctors [92]. In one study,
patients' requests for euthanasia were more persistent
when both the family and the patient wanted euthanasia,
suggesting that when families reinforce the request it may
be harder for patients to change their minds and retract
their request [21].
Psychiatric evaluations and physician-assisted suicide
In Oregon and in Lord Joffe's bill the patient is to be
referred to a psychiatrist or psychologist if a PAS doctor
believes that the patient's judgment is impaired by a psy-
chiatric or psychological disorder. Referral rarely takes
place. In Oregon, only 5% of PAS cases were referred for a
psychiatric evaluation in 2005, down from 31% in 1998
[6]. In the Netherlands, EAS requests for reasons of phys-
ical illness are to be referred for a psychiatric opinion as
per the Oregon guidelines. Furthermore, in all cases of
EAS for a mental disorder, which became legal in the
Netherlands in 1994, referral to a psychiatrist is advised.
Ten percent of Dutch EAS deaths were for reason of a men-
tal disorder. But only 4% of all Dutch EAS requests were
referred to a psychiatrist, indicating a serious under-refer-
ral rate for the psychiatric assessment of EAS requests.
What is more, EAS is sometimes carried out when a psy-
chiatrist has assessed that the case does not meet criteria,
despite Dutch guidelines [18].
The application of EAS to patients solely for a mental ill-
ness is worth addressing here as an aside since Lord Joffe
has stated that he favors an eventual "much wider applica-
tion" (pp53) [4] and that the current bill "is based on the
principle of autonomy and only a competent patient can make
a decision in relation to his or her own life. For people who are
mentally incompetent there needs to be, perhaps, a different sys-
tem..." (pp56) [4]. Euthanasia and PAS are legally applied
to individuals solely for their mental disorder in both Bel-
gium and the Netherlands [3]. Patients requesting EAS for
a mental disorder in the Netherlands tend to be younger
and female, with psychiatric diagnoses in completed EAS
cases consisting of mood disorders, personality disorders,
and 'unspecified' [18]. Highly publicized Dutch cases
include EAS by psychiatrists of a woman for major depres-
sion and bereavement [7] and a woman for depression
and anorexia nervosa [99]. Patients in the Netherlands
and in Belgium who want EAS for reason of their mental
illness generally ask their psychiatrists to assess their
request for assisted suicide or euthanasia. If the psychia-
trist agrees, he usually takes on the additional role of pre-
scribing the lethal overdose or carrying out euthanasia [3].
It has been observed that evaluating a patient's wish to die
while treating the patient for a mental illness destroys the
therapeutic boundaries that facilitate treatment [29,99],
and the situation of a psychiatrist carrying out euthanasia
on his patient is suggested to be "a highly complex situation,
which has to be treated cautiously" (pp 406) [3].
For patients requesting PAS for their terminal physical ill-
ness, a thorough psychiatric evaluation can be a crucial
catalyst for treatment and can alleviate distress [14]. ButBMC Family Practice 2006, 7:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/7/39
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the evidence suggests that mandating psychiatric evalua-
tions for all PAS requests will not solve the problem of
patients inappropriately receiving PAS. Only 6% of Ore-
gon psychiatrists were very confident that in one evalua-
tion they could adequately assess whether a patient had
the mental capacity for a PAS request [100]. Indeed, it has
been suggested that the assessment of PAS requests in the
terminally ill is so complex that it should be done by liai-
son psychiatrists [37]. But because many UK hospitals to
not have access to a liaison psychiatry service [4], UK
patients will not have uniform access to psychiatrists qual-
ified to assess their PAS requests. Bias may exist in psychi-
atric competency evaluations because the majority of
psychiatrists willing to evaluate a patient's capacity for
PAS are in favour of PAS [100] and psychiatrists' ethical
views for and against PAS affect clinical opinions regard-
ing patient capacity for PAS in different directions [101].
In addition, psychiatrists are not immune to the effects of
transference and countertransference, as illustrated by the
earlier case example of Dr. Chabot's participation in his
patient's assisted suicide [32].
Cases of PAS in Oregon show that if a patient is assessed
as depressed or lacking capacity for PAS, the patient or her
caregivers may continue to seek assessments until the
desired outcome is provided by agreeable doctors, includ-
ing psychiatrists and psychologists [16,28]. In the Austral-
ian Northern Territory, where EAS was legal for a short
period before revocation and psychiatric assessments for
EAS were mandatory, psychiatrists found that patients
requesting EAS sometimes withheld key information
because they saw the psychiatric assessment as a legal hur-
dle to be overcome. A gatekeeper role for psychiatrists was
found to be unworkable [102].
The effect of physician-assisted suicide on doctors
Studies have varied in how they represent the effect of EAS
on doctors, possibly because of doctors' mixed feelings
and the varied effects of participating in PAS. In a national
survey in the US, 58% of doctors who had assisted a sui-
cide reported feeling very comfortable with having taken
that role, yet only 39% would definitely do it again [103].
Among oncologists, 53% reported receiving comfort from
helping a patient with EAS and 24% regretted having per-
formed EAS. A third felt that the emotional burden asso-
ciated with performing EAS had affected their practice of
medicine, some positively by making them more sympa-
thetic listeners and others negatively, for example through
emotional burnout [104]. Dealing with requests for
assisted suicide or euthanasia is emotionally intense and
often engenders discomfort [24,32,105,106]. A Dutch
doctor who had carried out euthanasia many times said,
"The price of any dubious act is doubt...I don't sleep for the
week after" (pp 138), and "The idea that each case gets easier
and easier is just rubbish" (pp 137) [32]. Doctors rarely seek
support from their colleagues when dealing with PAS
requests, and contend with the issues in professional iso-
lation [24,106]. In doctors who control their aggression
through the practice of helping others [44], or whose
sense of self is carefully constructed on the basis on being
a beneficent and caring figure [29], participating in PAS
may create a sense of instability or conflict. For example,
one doctor said, "I find I can't turn off my feelings at work as
easily...because it does go against what I wanted to do as a phy-
sician..." (pp 457) [24]. Another said that ending a
patient's life made him or her feel "conflicted, at odds with
myself [and my role]" (pp 510) [104]. And another worried
about "playing God a little too much" (pp 510) [104]. Dob-
scha et al. [24] suggested that some Oregon doctors feared
being 'damaged' by participating in PAS, giving the exam-
ple of a doctor asking, "Are you doing something that you're
going to be uncomfortable with later?...you've got an indelible
mark upon your soul?" (pp 453–454) [24]. Oregon doctors
usually feel unprepared to deal with PAS requests, having
dealt with few in their practice, and worry about lack of
training and making legal mistakes. Not knowing the
patient well makes decision-making harder. Most who
choose to assist in suicide find that it requires a large
investment of their emotions and time. Doctors whether
they had refused or acceded to the PAS request did not
regret their decision, yet many who had acceded were
uncertain whether they would do so again [24]. One
described the surprise of experiencing the difference
between abstract agreement with PAS and carrying out
PAS: "Yeah, there is a huge gap between idealistic agreement
with a thought and actually being involved in it. It's just an
immeasurable gap that I hadn't anticipated" (pp 454) [24].
Others described an unsettling mismatch between the
reality and what they had imagined as the type of person
they would assist to commit suicide: "I kind of imagined
that if I had been asked it would be by somebody that was
already at the state of being in pain and feeling like they were
a burden. And at that point, she was living on her own and
doing very well" (pp 454) [24]. "But to actually do this to a
person who is functional, who is not clearly terminally ill, that
is a, that's a whole different ballgame" (pp 454) [24]. Doctors
also need to consider how they would feel if a patient they
assisted in suicide were found not to have a terminal ill-
ness. The Royal College of Pathologists points out that
post-mortem studies consistently show a 30% error rate in
diagnosing cause of death [4]. In a recent case, a woman
with depression falsified documents to create a history of
terminal liver cirrhosis. The Swiss doctor who was thus
deceived and administered her lethal injection committed
suicide after discovering from a routine autopsy that she
had no physical disease [107].
Guidelines and reporting in physician-assisted suicide
As shown by the examples above, countries that legalize
PAS or euthanasia using safeguards such as in Lord Joffe'sBMC Family Practice 2006, 7:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/7/39
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bill can decrease but not eliminate the number of patients
who are inappropriately assisted in suicide despite not
meeting PAS criteria. In regard to the success of guidelines
in achieving full reporting of PAS and euthanasia, this var-
ies substantially. The Oregon Department of Human Serv-
ices notes that it can monitor PAS only in patients who
legally receive prescriptions for lethal medications and
not in patients and doctors who may act outside the pro-
visions of the law [6]. However, a survey of dying Orego-
nians identified no unreported cases of PAS [108],
suggesting either no, or negligible, underreporting of PAS
in Oregon.
In contrast, reporting of PAS and euthanasia in the Neth-
erlands is very poor. Despite multiple revisions of the
Dutch EAS monitoring system, almost half of EAS cases
were still unreported by doctors in 2001 [109]. In cases of
unreported EAS [110], the most common reasons given
by doctors for not reporting EAS were primarily self-serv-
ing: 92% of GPs did not report 'to spare himself the
bother of a judicial inquiry' and 79% of nursing home
doctors did not report because they believe that the law
has no place in EAS decisions. This suggests that the power
of legal safeguards to determine the practice and monitor-
ing of PAS may be limited primarily by doctors' willing-
ness to comply based on their own interests.
The medical profession and physician-assisted suicide
Lord Joffe's bill would make doctors uniquely exempt
from the legal offence of assisting suicide, an offence that
would still apply to all other categories of person with a
penalty of up to 14 years' imprisonment. In a culture that
encourages medical action, therapeutic omnipotence, and
technological aspects of care [29], the administration of
death by doctors on request may be culturally attractive.
In common with other Western cultures, British society's
ideal of 'the good death' increasingly incorporates the
value of personal autonomy in terms of control over the
detailed circumstances of death, and also idealizes the
nature of the process by which doctor and patient arrive at
the conclusion that PAS is the best means to achieve that
end [22]. In view of Switzerland's proof that the technical
aspects of assisting suicide do not require a doctor's skill,
it would seem that despite PAS proponents' emphasis on
personal autonomy, doctors are needed on some deeper
level to fulfill another sort of role in PAS. It may be anal-
ogous to the situation of transference; British society
wishes doctors to be omnipotent and beneficent, provid-
ing reassurance, sanctioning its choices, and absolving it
of responsibility for life and death decisions.
UK doctors should consider their stand in the physician-
assisted suicide debate
In a recent representative survey of UK GPs and hospital
specialists who reported on their most recently attended
patient death, 97.4% did not think that a new UK law
allowing euthanasia or PAS would have enabled the
patient to receive better or more appropriate care, and it
was rare for doctors to feel that the current law had inter-
fered with their preferred management of the patient's
death [12]. Medical professional societies in the UK have
varied in their response to Lord Joffe's bill to legalize PAS.
The British Geriatrics Society opposes PAS and considers
elderly patients to be vulnerable to its misuse [13]. The
Royal College of Psychiatrists considers assisting suicide
to be incompatible with the psychiatrist's role of trying to
prevent suicide, and is deeply worried about the possible
pressures that legalized PAS could place on psychiatric
patients [111]. Both the Royal College of General Practi-
tioners and the Royal College of Physicians reversed from
neutrality to opposition to the legalization of PAS. The
British Medical Association is currently taking a neutral
stance and considers the legalization of physician-assisted
suicide to be 'a matter for society'. Like many others, the
BMA has responded to concern about PAS by emphasiz-
ing the need to 'press for robust safeguards'. But as
described in this paper, safeguards have not adequately
protected patients in other countries from the misapplica-
tion of PAS and doctors should not feel reassured that
they will in the UK. Findings from other countries also
indicate that patients who experience depression during
their terminal physical illness may constitute a group par-
ticularly vulnerable to the misapplication of PAS, espe-
cially if they are elderly or have a previous history of
mental illness.
The British government is taking a neutral stance while
observing the reactions of society, Parliament and UK pro-
fessionals to Lord Joffe's bill. UK doctors have access to an
adequate body of research and clinical expertise to inform
themselves, government and the public of the clinical
repercussions of legalizing PAS in the UK. It is incumbent
on doctors to formulate their position on PAS and to
decide whether providing PAS to the few who would cor-
rectly qualify in legal terms truly outweighs our responsi-
bility to advocate for the protection of other patients who
would be place at risk by its legalization.
Summary
￿ A bill to legalize physician-assisted suicide (PAS) in the
UK recently made significant progress in Parliament and
will be reintroduced in the future.
￿ Requests for PAS and doctors' decisions to assist suicide
can be influenced by coercion and by unconscious moti-
vations in doctors, patients and caregivers.
￿ Depression is greatly under-recognized in terminally ill
patients and increases the risk of the inappropriate use of
PAS.BMC Family Practice 2006, 7:39 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2296/7/39
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￿ Evidence from other countries shows that safeguards do
not adequately protect vulnerable patients from the mis-
application of PAS.
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